

SIPTA Summer School 15–19 August 2022 University of Bristol

Imprecision

(not as a problem, but as part of the solution)

Gert de Cooman

GHENT UNIVERSITY

Foundations Lab for imprecise probabilities

I have learnt from (talking to and working with) many ...



Teddy Seidenfeld



Peter Walley



Glenn Shafer



Volodya Vovk



Philip Dawid



Marco Zaffalon



Enrique Miranda



Matthias Troffaes



Erik Quaeghebeur



Jasper De Bock




Arthur Van Camp




Floris Persiau


Imprecision comes in many guises ...




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



PROBABILITY INTERVALS


















Maximise and minimise β under the constraints:


$$\alpha + \beta + \gamma + \delta = 1$$

$$\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \ge 0$$

$$\underline{P}(A) \le \alpha + \beta \le \overline{P}(A)$$

$$P(B) \le \beta + \gamma \le \overline{P}(B)$$






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$$\underline{P}(A \cap B) = \max\{0, \underline{P}(A) + \underline{P}(B) - 1\} \text{ and } \overline{P}(A \cap B) = \min\{\overline{P}(A), \overline{P}(B)\}$$



Sets of probability measures



closed and convex set of probability measures ${\mathfrak M}$ on Ω

CREDAL SET


Sets of probability measures



lower and upper envelopes of \mathfrak{M} :

 $\underline{P}(C) := \min\{P(C) : P \in \mathcal{M}\} \text{ and } \overline{P}(C) := \max\{P(C) : P \in \mathcal{M}\}\$

Sets of probability measures







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
EXPECTATION INTERVALS




$$\begin{split} &(1,0,0) \equiv \mathbb{I}_{\{a\}} \\ &(0,1,0) \equiv \mathbb{I}_{\{b\}} \\ &(0,0,1) \equiv \mathbb{I}_{\{c\}} \\ &(\alpha,\beta,\gamma) \equiv \underbrace{\alpha \mathbb{I}_{\{a\}} + \beta \mathbb{I}_{\{b\}} + \gamma \mathbb{I}_{\{c\}}}_{\text{gamble }g:\ \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}} \end{split}$$





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



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



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



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



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



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


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





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


assessment of lower and upper expectations of certain gambles









EXPECTATIONS

LOWER AND UPPER

Lower and upper expectations

Lower expectation:

+ inf
$$f \leq \underline{E}(f)$$

+
$$\underline{E}(f+g) \geqslant \underline{E}(f) + \underline{E}(g)$$

+
$$\underline{\underline{E}}(\lambda f) = \lambda \underline{\underline{E}}(f)$$
 for $\lambda \geqslant 0$

Conjugacy:

$$+ \overline{E}(f) = -\underline{E}(-f)$$

Expectation:

+ inf
$$f \leq E(f)$$

+
$$E(f + g) = E(f) + E(g)$$

+
$$E(\lambda f) = \lambda E(f)$$
 for all λ

Lower and upper expectations



Lower expectation:

- + inf $f \leq \underline{E}(f)$
- + $\underline{E}(f+g) \geqslant \underline{E}(f) + \underline{E}(g)$
- + $\underline{E}(\lambda f) = \lambda \underline{E}(f)$ for $\lambda \geqslant 0$

Conjugacy:


+
$$\overline{E}(f) = -E(-f)$$

Expectation:

- + inf $f \leqslant E(f)$
- + E(f + g) = E(f) + E(g)
- + $E(\lambda f) = \lambda E(f)$ for all λ


DECISION MAKING

$$f > 0 \Leftrightarrow \left(\underline{\underline{E}}(f) > 0 \text{ or } f > 0\right)$$



$$f > 0 \Leftrightarrow \left(\underline{\underline{E}}(f) > 0 \text{ or } f > 0\right)$$

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


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 $\Leftrightarrow \left(\overline{E}(f) < 0 \text{ or } f < 0\right)$




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
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
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



DESIRABLE GAMBLES



The logic of desirability is based on elementary statements

 $\vdash_{\mathsf{D}} f \longrightarrow$ 'the gamble f is desirable'.






A gamble $f: \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$ is desirable if it is strictly preferred to the zero gamble 0—the status quo.

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This logic is governed by the following axioms:

- + ⊬_D 0
- + if f > 0 then $\vdash_D f$
- + if $(\vdash_D f$ and $\vdash_D g)$ then $\vdash_D (f+g)$
- + if $\vdash_D f$ then $\vdash_D (\lambda f)$ for all real $\lambda > 0$



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CONSERVATIVE INFERENCE

The logic behind desirable gambles underlies all of (finitary) probability theory.

```
\underline{\underline{E}}(f) := \sup\{\alpha \in \mathbb{R} : \vdash_{\mathsf{D}} (f - \alpha)\}
```

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Bayes's rule is part of this logic and is therefore deductive:

$$\underline{\underline{F}}(f|A) := \sup\{\alpha \in \mathbb{R} : \vdash_{\mathsf{D}} (f - \alpha)\mathbb{I}_A\}$$

ALLOWING FOR IMPRECISION LAYS BARE THE CONSERVATIVE INFERENCE MECHANISM **BEHIND PROBABILISTIC REASONING**



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CHOICE FUNCTIONS

RECALL: BINARY CHOICE

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We can get to NON-BINARY CHOICE and the theory of choice functions by (essentially) adding an extra idea:

+ if
$$(\vdash_D f_1 \text{ or } \ldots \text{ or } \vdash_D f_n)$$
 then $\vdash_D \{f_1, \ldots, f_n\}$

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PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC ONLY WITH STATEMENTS:

'f is desirable'

REPRESENTATION RESULTS:

Levi's E-admissibility but with

- coherent set of desirable gambles instead of probability measure
- sets not necessarily closed nor convex
- extra axioms add extra structure

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ALLOWING FOR
IMPRECISION LAYS BARE
THE LINK BETWEEN
PROBABILISTIC REASONING
AND CHOICE THEORY, AND
EXTENDS IT SIGNIFICANTLY



RECALL: BINARY CHOICE

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
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PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC ONLY WITH STATEMENTS:


'f is desirable'

STOCHASTIC PROCESSES

IMPRECISE



$$X_1, X_2, X_3, ...$$




$$X_1, X_2, X_3, ...$$

Situations $s \in \mathbb{S}$ are the nodes in the event tree:

finite strings of states

Paths $\omega \in \Omega$ are the leaves in the event tree:

infinite strings of states



$$X_1, X_2, X_3, ...$$


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
Paths $\omega \in \Omega$ are the leaves in the event tree:

infinite strings of states

A process $F: \mathbb{S} \to \mathbb{R}$ attaches a real number F(s) to every situation s.




A precise probability tree attaches a local mass function p_s to every situation s.




A precise probability tree attaches a local mass function p_s to every situation s.

An imprecise probability tree attaches a local lower expectation \underline{E}_s to every situation s.




A precise probability tree attaches a local mass function p_s to every situation s.

An imprecise probability tree attaches a local set of desirable gambles D_s to every situation s.



A precise probability tree attaches a local mass function p_s to every situation s.

An imprecise probability tree attaches a local credal set \mathfrak{M}_s to every situation s.



A precise probability tree attaches a local mass function p_s to every situation s.

An imprecise probability tree attaches a local credal set \mathcal{M}_s to every situation s.


An imprecise probability tree is equivalent to a set of precise probability trees.

An imprecise probability tree is equivalent to a convex closed set of special processes, called supermartingales.




IMPRECISE


MARKOV CHAINS



$$\mathcal{M}_{(x_1,\ldots,x_n)}=\mathcal{M}_{x_n}$$




$$\mathfrak{M}_{(x_1,\ldots,x_n)}=\mathfrak{M}_{x_n}$$



Due to the Markov condition

$$\mathcal{M}_{(x_1,\ldots,x_n)}=\mathcal{M}_{x_n},$$

many inferences in imprecise Markov chains become polynomial in complexity, no longer exponential.



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$$\mathcal{M}_{(x_1,\ldots,x_n)}=\mathcal{M}_{x_n},$$

many inferences in imprecise Markov chains become polynomial in complexity, no longer exponential.

By allowing for imprecision, we can efficiently calculate conservative bounds on the behaviour of precise stochastic processes that are not Markov.




and









 \Rightarrow LUMPING





ALGORITHMIC RANDOMNESS


011001101010111110010111000111010101011011011011100011...



011001101010111110010111000111010101011011011011100011...

random for a precise probability tree

→randomness tests →supermartingales




random for a precise probability tree

→randomness tests

 \rightarrow supermartingales

random for an imprecise probability tree →randomness tests →supermartingales






random for more precise probability tree




random for less precise probability tree



random for more precise probability tree

↓ but not ↑

random for less precise probability tree




random for more precise probability tree


↓ but not ↑

random for less precise probability tree

EXAMPLE:

NONSTATIONARY PRECISE ⇒ STATIONARY IMPRECISE







In summary ...

IMPRECISION IN PROBABILITY THEORY ALLOWS US AND HELPS US TO

- + deal honestly and systematically with indecision and incompleteness
- + see the precise special case in a much wider, structured mathematical perspective and context
- + identify and use the logic and conservative inference mechanisms behind probabilistic reasoning
- + provide a natural link between measure-theoretic and game-theoretic probability
- + look at and use simpler and more conservative models that are computationally more tractable

THE END - FOR NOW