

SIPTA

SIPTA Summer School
15–19 August 2022
University of Bristol

Desirability

- the basics of inference under uncertainty


Gert de Cooman



Foundations Lab
for imprecise probabilities

BASIC SETUP

Uncertainty about a variable



You are uncertain about the **value** of a **variable** X in a **set** \mathcal{X} .

- You = a subject aiming to be rational
- **possibility space** $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ is **finite!**
- notation:

lowercase x = a possible value, or the actual value

uppercase X = the unknown value

Gambles on a variable


A **gamble** g (on the variable X) is an **uncertain reward** whose value depends on the value of X in \mathcal{X} .

Rewards are expressed in units of some **linear utility** scale.

$$g: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

We also denote this gamble by $g(X)$.

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
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$$(g(x_1), \dots, g(x_n)) \in \mathbb{R}^n.$$

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$$\mathcal{X} = \{H, T\}$$



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The **set of all gambles** $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$ is a **linear space** that is isomorphic to \mathbb{R}^n .

PREFERENCE AND DESIRABILITY

Strict preference orderings

Your **beliefs** about what value X assumes in \mathfrak{X} may lead you to (strictly) **prefer** one uncertain reward $g(X)$ over another $h(X)$:

$$g > h.$$

Strict preference orderings

Weak strict ordering:

W₁. $g > g$ for no $g \in \mathcal{L}(X)$;

W₂. if $g_1 > g_2$ and $g_2 > g_3$
then $g_1 > g_3$, for
all $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in \mathcal{L}(X)$.

Strict vector ordering:

V₁. $g > h \Leftrightarrow \lambda g > \lambda h$,
for all $\lambda > 0$;

V₂. $g_1 > g_2 \Leftrightarrow$
 $g_1 + h > g_2 + h$,
for all $h \in \mathcal{L}(X)$.

Dominance \geq :

$g \geq h \Leftrightarrow$
 $g(x) \geq h(x)$ for all $x \in X$.

Strict dominance $>$:

$g > h \Leftrightarrow (g \geq h \text{ and } g \neq h)$.

Your **beliefs** about what value X assumes in X may lead you to (strictly) prefer one uncertain reward $g(X)$ over another $h(X)$:

$$g > h.$$

The **binary relation** $>$ on $\mathcal{L}(X)$:

- is a **weak strict ordering** due to basic **rationality** requirements;
- is a **strict vector ordering** due to the **linearity** of the utility scale;
- respects **strict dominance**: if $g > h$ then $g > h$.

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
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Incomparability does not imply **equivalence**.

We allow for PARTIAL preference!

Desirability

$$\mathcal{X} = \{H, T\}$$



$$g > h \Leftrightarrow g - h > 0.$$

Desirability


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The strict preference ordering $>$ is completely determined by the set of desirable gambles:

$$D = \{g \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X}) : g > 0\}.$$

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
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Coherence of a set of desirable gambles D :

- D₁. $0 \notin D$;
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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CONSERVATIVE INFERENCE


Simple desirability statements



$\vdash_D g$

You state that a **gamble g is desirable** when You strictly prefer it to the zero gamble (status quo).

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


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


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- $\vdash_D (\mathbb{I}_A - \alpha)$: You are willing to bet on the event A at betting rate α ;
- $\vdash_D (\alpha - \mathbb{I}_A)$: You are willing to bet against the event A at betting rate $1 - \alpha$

A logic of desirability statements

What are the consequences of making an assessment \mathcal{A} ?

An **assessment** \mathcal{A} collects
(some) gambles that You
find desirable:

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- $D_4.$ if $g \in D$ then $\lambda g \in D$ for $\lambda > 0.$ [production axiom]

- we call a set $D \subseteq \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$ **coherent** if it satisfies D_1 – D_4 .
- we collect all coherent D in the set $\bar{\mathbf{D}}$.

Conservative inference

$\bar{\mathbf{D}}$ is closed under non-empty intersections:

$$D_i \in \bar{\mathbf{D}} \text{ for all } i \in I$$

↓

$$\bigcap_{i \in I} D_i \in \bar{\mathbf{D}}$$

Conservative inference

Deductive closure operator:

$$\text{cl}_{\mathbf{D}}(\mathcal{A}) := \bigcap \{D \in \bar{\mathbf{D}} : \mathcal{A} \subseteq D\}$$

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
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- $\mathbf{D} := \bar{\mathbf{D}} \cup \{\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})\}$ is the set of all deductively closed sets of desirable gambles;
- An assessment \mathcal{A} is **consistent** if $\text{cl}_{\mathbf{D}}(\mathcal{A}) \neq \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$.

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
When \mathcal{A} is **consistent**, then

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
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
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CONDITIONING


Conditioning

To bring in **conditioning**, we consider **called-off gambles** $\mathbb{I}_A g$



$$(\mathbb{I}_A g)(x) := \mathbb{I}_A(x)g(x) = \begin{cases} g(x) & \text{if } x \in A \\ 0 & \text{if } x \notin A. \end{cases}$$

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
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Conditional assessment in a logic of desirability statements:

$$g \text{ is } \text{desirable conditional on } A \longrightarrow \vdash_D \mathbb{I}_A g \longrightarrow \mathbb{I}_A g \in D$$

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Conditioning operation $\cdot|A: \overline{D} \rightarrow \overline{D}: D \mapsto D|A$

$$g \in D|A \Leftrightarrow (g > 0 \text{ or } \mathbb{I}_A g \in D) \text{ for all } g \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$$

A LITTLE EXERCISE

Exercise on desirability: the problem

Consider next week's football match between your favourite team *Marginal* and that unspeakable team *Zichem-Zussen-Bolder*.

You make the following statements about the outcome of this match for *Marginal*:

- A win (W) is more likely than a draw (D);
- A loss (L) is more likely than a draw;
- If no draw, then a win is more than twice as likely as a loss.

Question:

Can You consistently bet on draw at rates higher than $\frac{1}{2}$?

SUMMING UP

Advantages of the desirability approach

Working with **sets of desirable gambles**:

- is simple, intuitive and elegant;
- gives a **geometrical flavour** to probabilistic inference;
- shows that probabilistic inference is a form of '**logical inference**';
- avoids problems with **conditioning** on sets of **probability zero**.

Next, we will see that:

- it allows us to **derive other models**, such as (conditional) lower previsions, (sets of) conditional probabilities, ...;
- it is **more general** and **more expressive** than these other models.

THE END - FOR NOW